2024/01/31

Recent PLA Conscription Situation

Author: Cheng-kun Ma, Director of RCDA

Originally Published on 大陸與兩岸情勢簡報 (January 2024)

The PLA’s national recruitment in 2023 took place from February 15 to March 31 and from August 15 to September 30, primarily targeting university students. The revised "Regulations on Conscription Work," published on May 1, prioritizes the enlistment of high school graduates and those with special political, physical, or professional skills. Additionally, regional recruitment tasks can be directly assigned to local high school. At the national conscription conference in January, the focus was on enlisting university students, particularly those in science and engineering, and individuals with skills needed for "preparing for war." This highlighted the PLA's increased demand for high-quality recruits amidst military modernization efforts.

However, information from various local conscription offices indicated that young people in mainland China, especially university graduates, were generally not enthusiastic about joining the military. 

For new graduates, the economic incentives for enlisting were insufficient. The average monthly salary for university graduates in the military was around 1,000 RMB, totaling 12,000 RMB annually. While specialized positions, especially in science and engineering, offered better salaries, these did not compare favorably with civilian employment opportunities. Based on a survey conducted by relevant institutions in China, the average annual income of university graduates in 2022 was 71,900 RMB, with an average monthly income of 5,990 RMB. Graduates in the fields of information technology and engineering had an average annual income exceeding 80,000 RMB.

Despite the PLA's efforts to increase allowances and veteran benefits, particularly for those in technical fields, top university graduates, such as those from Peking University and Tsinghua University, prefered higher-paying, more promising civilian jobs. For instance, only 12 out of 8,003 Tsinghua graduates in 2022 joined the PLA. 

Graduates from non-prestigious universities who struggle to find good jobs were generally not keen on enlisting in the military. They would rather choose other work, such as taking delivery orders, which was more appealing than joining the armed forces. For example, the most common job among young people today is food delivery. The average monthly income for delivery workers is around 7,000 to 7,500 RMB. Those who are more diligent can earn over 10,000 RMB per month, while the least successful still make around 4,000 to 5,000 RMB.

Another factor contributing to the reluctance of young people, especially university graduates, to enlist in the military is family upbringing. Before 2015, China implemented a one-child policy, leading most couples to have only one child. As the economy developed and household incomes increased, parents tended to fulfill their only child's needs as much as possible. Additionally, the development of computers, smartphones, and other digital devices had made today's young people part of the internet generation, enabling them to easily access information online. This had resulted in a generation that was less inclined to obey discipline and authority compared to the previous generation.

However, these young people were required to undergo military training before entering university. According to the National Defense Law and the Military Service Law of China, ordinary high school and university students must receive basic military training. This training typically took place before the start of the school year, lasting one week for high school students and two weeks for university students.

Another factor affecting young people's willingness to join the military in China is the perception of unfair conscription shaped by the system. The Chinese Communist Party implements a conscription system based on the Military Service Law. However, due to China's large population, the number of eligible young people far exceeds the annual new recruit quota needed by the military. As a result, the CCP has long adopted a "selection" mode in the implementation of its conscription system. The local People's Armed Forces Departments were responsible for compiling lists of eligible citizens within their jurisdiction. Military conscription personnel, in conjunction with local officials, review the political, physical, and cultural qualifications of these candidates. Only those meeting all criteria are selected for enlistment. 

Since local and military officials in charge of conscription had the authority to decide who must enlist and who could avoid conscription, the system created opportunities for these officials to exploit their positions for personal gain. For individuals who met the conscription criteria but were unwilling to serve, or those who did not meet the criteria but wished to join the military, bribery was a viable way to achieve their goals.

For a long time, the practice of using bribes to avoid military service or secure enlistment has been widely known in local communities. Despite the Chinese Communist Party's official media continually promoting the virtuous deeds of the People's Liberation Army and insisting on "clean conscription" during annual conscription, the impression of corruption within the military remained deeply ingrained among the youth. The perception that military officials accepted bribes to allow those unwilling to serve to avoid conscription was firmly rooted in their minds.

According to the newly revised Article 29 of the conscription regulations, "Soldiers who had retired from active service and voluntarily applied under suitable conditions might be approved for re-enlistment, with priority assignment to their original units or similar positions; those meeting the conditions for non-commissioned officers might be directly recruited as non-commissioned officers." Many outside observers interpreted this provision as China's preparation to ensure sufficient troop reserves for potential large-scale military conflicts. However, the reality was quite the opposite—it actually reflected the current challenges the military faces in conscription.

To address these conscription difficulties, the Chinese Communist Party had not only relaxed age restrictions for soldiers of different educational backgrounds but also allowed retired soldiers to re-enlist. It was important to note that these soldiers had completed their mandatory service of at least 2 years or longer, making their average age relatively higher. The adjustment of enlistment age limits across various soldier categories in the People's Liberation Army indicated that the current younger generation in China did not exhibit a particularly enthusiastic attitude towards responding to the call of the central government to join the military and contribute to the nation's great rejuvenation.